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The King Can Truly Do No Wrong: Governmental Immunity 
and Rights Relative to the Crown in North Carolina After 
Bynum* 
  Under our system the people, who are [in England] called 
subjects, are the sovereign. Their rights, whether collective or 
individual, are not bound to give way to a sentiment of loyalty to 
the person of the monarch. The citizen here knows no person, 
however near to those in power, or however powerful himself, to 
whom he need yield the rights which the law secures to him when 
it is well administered.1 
—JUSTICE SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER 
INTRODUCTION 
The notion that government entities—federal, state, or local—
are largely or entirely exempt from defending ordinary actions in 
court has long enjoyed the comfort of being treated as “an established 
doctrine.”2 Indeed, despite originating entirely as a creature of 
common law, the courts of North Carolina view the doctrine as so 
well established that they have, for at least the last four decades, 
entirely ceded any responsibility for modifying or abrogating the rule 
to the North Carolina General Assembly.3 Despite the considerable 
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 1. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208 (1882). 
 2. See id. at 207 (“[T]he exemption of the United States and of the several States 
from being subjected as defendants to ordinary actions in the courts has . . . been 
repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never been discussed or the reasons for it given, 
but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.”); The Siren, 74 U.S. 152, 164 
(1868) (“Now, no principle at common law is better settled than that the government is 
not liable for the wrongful acts of her public agents.”); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 386, 
389 (1850) (“No maxim is thought to be better established, or more universally assented 
to, than that which ordains that a sovereign, or a government representing the sovereign, 
cannot ex delicto be amenable to its own creatures or agents employed under its own 
authority for the fulfillment merely of its own legitimate ends. A departure from this 
maxim can be sustained only upon the ground of permission on the part of the sovereign 
or the government expressly declared . . . .”); N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Guilford Technical Cmty. Coll., 364 N.C. 102, 107, 691 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2010) (“It is an 
established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound public policy, that a 
state may not be sued in its own courts or elsewhere unless by statute it has consented to 
be sued or has otherwise waived its immunity from suit.”). 
 3. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971) 
(“[A]ny further modification or the repeal of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should 
come from the General Assembly, not this Court.”). 
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confusion4 and disdain5 surrounding the doctrine, both the courts and 
the general assembly have shown minimal interest in either revisiting 
the doctrine’s historical (mis)conceptions or curtailing its 
contemporary application.6 
The present-day scope of the doctrine of governmental immunity 
in North Carolina was recently outlined in Bynum v. Wilson County,7 
where a majority of the Supreme Court of North Carolina effectively 
barred plaintiffs from bringing claims for harms occurring on any 
county or municipal property.8 By framing its holding in the language 
of precedent and underscoring its reluctance to modify or repeal the 
doctrine of governmental immunity without the general assembly’s 
consent, the majority implicitly argued that its holding was 
representative of the current state of affairs in North Carolina.9 
However, as this Recent Development will suggest, the holding could 
have new and far-reaching effects on the remedies available to 
potential plaintiffs injured on government property, while presenting 
a renewed opportunity to examine the contemporary appropriateness 
of a doctrine that could generously be described as “unsound.”10 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of 
governmental immunity in North Carolina by examining the case law 
that serves as the backbone of this common law doctrine. Part II 
presents the facts at issue and analyzes the competing opinions in the 
 
 4. See, e.g., Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 360, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) 
(Martin, J., concurring) (“Despite efforts over many years to bring clarity and 
predictability to the law of governmental immunity, this goal has remained somewhat 
elusive.”). 
 5. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1426 
(1987) (“ ‘[S]overeignty’ has become an oppressive concept in our courts. A state 
government that orders or allows its officials to violate citizens’ federal constitutional 
rights can invoke ‘sovereign’ immunity from all liability—even if such immunity means 
that the state’s wrongdoing will go partially or wholly unremedied.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (2001) (“Sovereign immunity is 
an anachronistic relic and the entire doctrine should be eliminated from American law.”). 
 6. See Steelman, 279 N.C. at 589, 184 S.E.2d at 239 (holding that 
“any . . . modification or the repeal of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come 
from the General Assembly, not this Court”). 
 7. 367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014). 
 8. Id. at 361, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (Martin, J., concurring) (“This reasoning would seem 
to create a categorical rule barring any premises liability claims against counties or 
municipalities for harms that occur on government property.”). 
 9. See id. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (majority opinion) (“The rule set out by the Court 
of Appeals . . . is inconsistent with our precedent on governmental immunity. Accordingly, 
we reverse th[at] decision . . . .”). 
 10. See Steelman, 279 N.C. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243 (“It may well be that the logic of 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unsound and that the reasons which led to its 
adoption are not as forceful today as they were when it was adopted.”). 
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Bynum court’s recent decision, which dramatically altered the law of 
governmental immunity in North Carolina. Part III continues the 
discussion by arguing that the concurring opinion in Bynum was the 
correct one, both in terms of respecting precedent and limiting the 
effects of this anachronistic doctrine. Finally, Part IV uses the Bynum 
decision to reconsider the foundation and merits of governmental 
immunity and urges the general assembly to find that the doctrine, 
derived from long-discredited notions of royal infallibility, is 
indefensible under both the United States and North Carolina 
constitutions and is generally inconsistent with the purposes of 
assigning tort liability. 
I.  GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN NORTH CAROLINA 
Before turning to the impact and implications of the Bynum 
decision, it is important to examine the jurisprudential development 
of governmental immunity in North Carolina. While Part IV of this 
Recent Development will examine the contemporary criticisms of the 
doctrine and the responses of several state legislatures to those 
critiques, this Part focuses exclusively on the evolution of the doctrine 
and the case law that provides a backdrop for a full consideration of 
the decision in Bynum. Section A of this Part briefly sketches the 
foundations of the doctrine in the State and provides the necessary 
perspective for a full consideration of the court’s task in Bynum. 
Section B of this Part details the North Carolina courts’ attempts to 
delineate a line of case law establishing the boundaries of local 
government liability. 
A. The History of Governmental Immunity in North Carolina 
For well over a century, North Carolina has recognized the rule 
of governmental, or sovereign, immunity,11 under which a county or 
 
 11. Historically, sovereign immunity applied to the state and its agencies while 
governmental immunity applied to municipal corporations. Older rulings held that 
“[c]ounties are not, in a strictly legal sense, municipal corporations, like cities and towns” 
and “[i]n the exercise of ordinary governmental functions, they are simply agencies of the 
state.” O’Berry v. Mecklenburg Cnty., 198 N.C. 357, 360, 151 S.E. 880, 882 (1930). 
However, more recent decisions have erased both the distinction between governmental 
and sovereign immunity and the distinction between counties and municipalities for the 
purpose of immunity. See, e.g., Bynum, 367 N.C. at 359–60, 758 S.E.2d at 646–47 (finding 
that Wilson “County is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of governmental 
immunity” and using “municipality” in a discussion of Wilson County); Estate of Williams 
ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 204, 732 
S.E.2d 137, 144 (2012) (expressing no opinion “on whether [the county] in this case [is] 
ultimately entitled to governmental immunity”). 
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municipality “is immune from suit for the negligence of its employees 
in the exercise of governmental functions absent waiver of 
immunity."12 The courts of North Carolina have long held as “an 
established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound 
public policy, that a state may not be sued in its own courts or 
elsewhere unless by statute it has consented to be sued or has 
otherwise waived its immunity from suit.”13 By extension, “a 
subordinate division of the state, or agency exercising statutory 
governmental functions . . . may be sued only when and as authorized 
by statute.”14 
However, governmental immunity has not, at least historically, 
been without limits. Traditionally, the doctrine “covers only the acts 
of a municipality or a municipal corporation committed pursuant to 
its governmental functions.”15 According to the historical conception 
of the doctrine, governmental immunity did not apply when a county 
or municipality engaged in a proprietary activity by “undertak[ing] 
functions beyond its governmental and police powers and engag[ing] 
in business in order to render a public service for the benefit of the 
community for a profit.”16 The question of governmental immunity 
has, therefore, traditionally turned on whether the alleged conduct 
arose from an activity that was governmental or proprietary in 
nature.17 A governmental function is an activity that is “discretionary, 
political, legislative, or public in nature and performed for the public 
good on behalf of the State rather than for itself.”18 Conversely, a 
 
 12. Williams, 366 N.C. at 198, 732 S.E.2d at 140 (quoting Evans ex rel. Horton v. 
Hous. Auth. of Raleigh, 359 N.C. 50, 53, 602 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2004)); see Moffitt v. City of 
Asheville, 103 N.C. 237, 255, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889) (adopting the doctrine of governmental 
immunity by stating a city or town “incurs no liability for the negligence of its officers” 
acting under authority conferred by its charter or for the sole benefit of the public); see 
also Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 519, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1972) (“This 
Court has not departed from the rule of governmental immunity adopted in the year 
1889.”). 
 13. N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Guilford Technical Cmty. Coll., 364 N.C. 
102, 107, 691 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2010) (quoting Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 6, 68 S.E.2d 785, 
787 (1952)).  
 14. Id. (quoting Smith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 6, 68 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1952)). 
 15. Williams, 366 N.C. at 199, 732 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting Evans ex rel Horton v. Hous. 
Auth. of Raleigh, 359 N.C. 50, 53, 602 S.E.2d 668, 670 (2004)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 16. Id. (quoting Town of Grimesland v. City of Washington, 234 N.C. 117, 123, 66 
S.E.2d 794, 798 (1951)) (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (quoting Britt v. City of Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 450, 73 S.E.2d 289, 293 
(1952)). Examples of activities that North Carolina courts have held to be governmental 
include the operation of a public library, see Seibold v. Kinston-Lenoir Cnty. Pub. Library, 
264 N.C. 360, 361, 141 S.E.2d 519, 519 (1965) (per curiam) (“The operation of a public 
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proprietary function is “commercial or chiefly for the private 
advantage of the compact community.”19 
Given that “any further modification or the repeal of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General 
Assembly, not this Court,”20 North Carolina’s “threshold inquiry in 
determining whether a function is proprietary or governmental is 
whether, and to what degree, the legislature has addressed the 
issue.”21 In the absence of a statute that preempts governmental 
immunity, when a county or municipality is “acting in the exercise of 
police power, or judicial, discretionary, or legislative authority, 
conferred by its charter or by statute . . . it is not liable.”22 Therefore, 
as the court’s language in Estate of Williams ex rel. Overton v. 
Pasquotank County Parks & Recreation Department makes clear, the 
threshold question is not only whether the legislature has addressed 
the localities’ ability to act, but also to what degree it has addressed 
the question.23 If the legislature has merely granted counties 
permission to act on an issue, the degree to which it has addressed the 
question, in the courts’ view, is substantially less and the activity is 
therefore more likely to be proprietary. In contrast, if the legislature 
has required counties to act, the activity is more likely to be 
governmental.24 Accordingly, courts have focused on the statutory 
language granting counties the authority to act on certain matters.25 
Highlighting this important distinction between permissive and 
required statutory language, several North Carolina statutes grant 
legislative authority to counties to perform functions that have 
 
library meets the test of ‘governmental function,’ as stated in repeated decisions rendered 
by this Court.”), and the operation of a register of deeds office, see Robinson v. Nash 
Cnty., 43 N.C. App. 33, 36, 257 S.E.2d 679, 681 (1979) (finding that the operation of a 
register of deeds office “is clearly a governmental function for which the county enjoys 
immunity from suit for negligence”). 
 19. Williams, 366 N.C. at 199, 732 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting Britt v. City of Wilmington, 
236 N.C. 446, 450, 73 S.E.2d 289, 293 (1952)). Examples of activities that North Carolina 
courts have held to be proprietary in nature include the operation of a convention center, 
see Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 497, 144 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1965), and the act of 
contracting for the construction of a sewer system, see Town of Sandy Creek v. E. Coast 
Contracting, Inc., __ N.C. App. __, __, 741 S.E.2d 673, 674 (2013). 
 20. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971). 
 21. Williams, 366 N.C. at 200, 732 S.E.2d at 141–42. 
 22. Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 46, 59 S.E.2d 195, 198 (1950) 
(emphasis added). 
 23. Williams, 366 N.C. at 200, 732 S.E.2d at 141–42. 
 24. See id. 
 25. See McIver v. Smith, 134 N.C. App. 583, 586, 518 S.E.2d 522, 525 (1999) (“It is also 
noteworthy that the legislature granted counties the power to operate ambulance services 
in all or part of their respective jurisdictions.”). 
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traditionally been held to be proprietary—not governmental—
functions.26 For example, pursuant to one statute, counties may 
construct, own, and operate other public enterprises, including 
airports and public transit systems.27 Yet courts have held that such 
“public enterprises are proprietary by nature” and do not entitle 
counties to governmental immunity.28 In these instances of permissive 
language, the grant of legislative authority has historically been 
considered instructive and “noteworthy” but not determinative.29 
B. Consideration of Governmental Immunity by the North Carolina 
Courts 
Given that the ultimate determination of whether an activity is 
governmental or proprietary therefore turns on the degree to which 
the legislature has addressed the issue—a “fact intensive inquiry” that 
“may differ from case to case”30—the courts’ approach to previous 
inquiries outlines the boundaries of the doctrine. The cases that 
follow show not only that the courts are willing to find that a 
permissive grant from the legislature fails to designate a specific 
activity as governmental but also that the courts have been willing to 
distinguish proprietary portions of an inherently governmental 
activity to assign liability to a locality. 
Aaser v. City of Charlotte,31 one of North Carolina’s leading cases 
on governmental immunity prior to Bynum,32 clearly tracks the 
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions. In 
Aaser, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that when a “city is 
engaging in a proprietary function . . . the liability of the city . . . to the 
plaintiff for injury, due to an unsafe condition of the premises, is the 
same as that of a private person or corporation.”33 Based on this 
 
 26. See, e.g., infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 27. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-274 to -275 (2013). 
 28. McIver, 134 N.C. App. at 588, 518 S.E.2d at 526; see also Hare v. Butler, 99 N.C. 
App. 693, 699, 394 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1990) (“Non-traditional governmental activities such 
as the operation of a golf course or an airport are usually characterized as proprietary 
functions.”). 
 29. See generally McIver, 134 N.C. App. at 586, 518 S.E.2d at 525 (explaining that the 
focus should be on the nature of the service rather than the provider of the service). 
 30. Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 746 S.E.2d 296, 302 (2013) 
(quoting Estate of Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation 
Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 203, 732 S.E.2d 137, 143 (2012)), rev’d in part, 367 N.C. 355, 758 
S.E.2d 643 (2014). 
 31. 265 N.C. 494, 144 S.E.2d 610 (1965). 
 32. See Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 361, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) (Martin, 
J., concurring) (leading with Aaser to show that the majority’s approach is “inconsistent 
with our long-standing precedent”). 
 33. Aaser, 265 N.C. at 497, 144 S.E.2d at 613. 
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reasoning, the court held that by operating and leasing a coliseum, 
Charlotte had engaged in a proprietary activity and could incur 
liability for injuries sustained on the premises.34 In contrast, cases 
where the defendant county was engaged in a clearly governmental 
activity have established a precedent that precludes liability where the 
plaintiff was injured on government property, such as by falling down 
the steps of a register of deeds office35 or a government-owned 
library.36 
However, even if a county provides a governmental service in the 
broadest sense, it may still be liable if a specific part of that service is 
proprietary. In Williams, a case very similar to Aaser, an individual 
drowned in a public park that was owned and operated by the 
defendant, Pasquotank County.37 However, the drowning occurred in 
an area of the park known as the “Swimming Hole” that was rented 
out to private parties in exchange for a fee.38 The trial court, in an 
order upheld by a unanimous court of appeals panel,39 denied the 
county’s motion for summary judgment based on governmental 
immunity and ruled that the county “charged and collected a 
fee . . . [while] providing the same type of facilities and services that 
private individuals or corporations could provide.”40 In reviewing the 
lower courts’ decisions, the state supreme court acknowledged that 
the general assembly had statutorily established that the “creation, 
establishment, and operation of parks and recreation programs is a 
proper governmental function”41 but remanded the case for further 
consideration of whether the “specific operation of the Swimming 
 
 34. See id. at 501, 144 S.E.2d at 616 (ultimately concluding that the evidence “does not 
justify an inference that such activity was either dangerous or recurring or known to the 
city” and granting the motion for judgment of nonsuit). 
 35. Robinson v. Nash Cnty., 43 N.C. App. 33, 36, 257 S.E.2d 679, 681 (1979) (holding 
that the operation of a register of deeds office “is clearly a governmental function for 
which the county enjoys immunity from suit for negligence”). 
 36. Seibold v. Kinston-Lenoir Cnty. Pub. Library, 264 N.C. 360, 361, 141 S.E.2d 519, 
520 (1965) (per curiam) (“The operation of a public library meets the test of 
‘governmental function,’ as stated in repeated decisions rendered by this Court.”). 
 37. 366 N.C. 195, 196, 732 S.E.2d 137, 139 (2012). 
 38. Id. at 196–97, 732 S.E.2d at 139. 
 39. Estate of Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 
211 N.C. App. 627, 632, 711 S.E.2d 450, 454 (2011). 
 40. Order Denying Defendants’ Limited Motion for Summary Judgment at 69, Estate 
of Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, No. 08 CVS 
927, 2009 WL 8666345 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2009). 
 41. Williams, 366 N.C. at 201, 732 S.E.2d at 142 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-351 
(2013)). 
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Hole component of [the park], in this case and under these 
circumstances, [was] a governmental function.”42 
Likewise, in Town of Sandy Creek v. East Coast Contracting43 the 
court again parsed governmental authority and noted that, although 
the “construction of a sewer system is a governmental function[,]” the 
“allegations of breaches of the duty of reasonable care [arising from 
contracts to build that sewer system] do not concern decisions of 
government discretion.”44 Thus the court found that “a local 
governmental unit acts in a proprietary function when it contracts 
with engineering and construction companies, regardless of whether 
the project under construction will be a governmental function once it 
is completed.”45 This ruling solidified the premise of Williams—that 
even where a county is operating under a broad grant of statutory 
authority, the courts should continue to determine whether the 
specific operation at issue is a governmental or a proprietary function. 
Therefore, the courts’ jurisprudence has firmly established a 
precedent under which judges must first evaluate whether, and to 
what degree, the legislature has addressed the issue in question. If the 
legislature has not addressed the activity or has merely given counties 
permission to engage in the activity without requiring that they do so, 
the activity is, at least historically, unlikely to be viewed as 
governmental and therefore immunized from suit. However, where 
the legislature is silent or merely permissive, the courts have also 
viewed the determination of whether an activity is proprietary or 
governmental to be a “fact intensive inquiry” that may “differ from 
case to case.”46 It was against this precedential backdrop that the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina took up the appeal in Bynum. 
II.  BYNUM V. WILSON COUNTY 
Notwithstanding the extensive jurisprudential history of 
governmental immunity claims in North Carolina, a majority of the 
supreme court in Bynum not only found that the legislature had 
addressed the maintenance of public buildings to a much greater 
degree than had previously been contemplated but eschewed much, if 
not all, of the fact-specific investigation that had guided previous 
inquiries. Section A of this Part sets out the facts and procedural 
 
 42. Id. The case has not been resolved on remand. 
 43. ___ N.C. App. ___, 741 S.E.2d 673 (2013). 
 44. Id. at ___, 741 S.E.2d at 675–76. 
 45. Id. at ___, 741 S.E.2d at 677. 
 46. Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 746 S.E.2d 296, 302 (2013) 
(quoting Williams, 366 N.C. at 203, 732 S.E.2d at 143). 
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history of Bynum, while Sections B through D detail the competing 
logic of the opinions put forth by the court of appeals, the supreme 
court’s majority, and the supreme court’s concurrence. While an 
analysis of the merits of each of the three positions is reserved for 
Part III, the precedential teachings provided by the cases in Part I are 
particularly relevant to the consideration of the opinions detailed 
below. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
Defendant-Appellant Wilson County leased an office building 
(“Miller Road Building”) where it housed a number of county 
departments and divisions, including “the county commissioners 
meeting room, the planning department, the inspections department, 
the water department, the finance department, the human resources 
department, and the office of the county manager.”47 Plaintiff-
Appellee James Earl Bynum entered the Miller Road Building on 
April 15, 2008 to pay his water bill.48 After paying his bill, Mr. Bynum 
fell while walking down the front exterior steps of the building and 
sustained serious injuries resulting in paralysis of his legs and right 
arm.49 
Mr. Bynum subsequently filed a complaint, which, after 
amendment, alleged that defendants 
negligently failed to inspect, maintain, and repair the Miller 
Road building steps, failed to meet the requirements of the 
North Carolina Building Code, failed to install a required 
handrail, failed to be aware of and warn of a hidden danger, 
and failed to ensure that the Miller Road building was 
accessible to the public in a safe condition.50 
After Mr. Bynum’s death, his wife (“Ms. Bynum”) continued “the 
action both in her individual capacity and as administratrix of [the] 
estate” and amended “the complaint to assert a wrongful death 
claim.”51 
In February 2012, Wilson County filed a motion for summary 
judgment asserting, inter alia, governmental immunity.52 The trial 
 
 47. Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 356, 758 S.E.2d 643, 644–45 (2014). 
 48. Id. at 356, 758 S.E.2d at 645. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 357, 758 S.E.2d at 645. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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court denied the motion,53 and the defendants subsequently 
appealed.54 Although it dismissed the “non-immunity-related 
challenges” as interlocutory in nature, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals ruled on the trial court’s determination of governmental 
immunity by following established precedent from the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina.55 
B. The Opinion of the Court of Appeals 
Following Wilson County’s appeal of the trial court’s order 
denying its motion for summary judgment, a three-judge panel of the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals reconsidered the lower court’s 
decision. Adhering to the well-established precedent of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina,56 a unanimous court of appeals determined 
that “the proper designation of a particular action of a county or 
municipality is a fact intensive inquiry, turning on the facts alleged in 
the complaint, and may differ from case to case.”57 In examining the 
facts of Bynum, the court of appeals relied heavily on precedent—
including Aaser, Sandy Creek, and Williams—and focused both on the 
nature of the defendant-government’s actions and on the interaction 
between defendant and plaintiff.58 
The court of appeals’ interpretation of this precedent led it to 
conclude that the determinative factor in deciding if “a particular 
injury resulted from a governmental or proprietary activity is the 
nature of the plaintiff’s involvement with the governmental unit and 
the reason for the plaintiff’s presence at a governmental facility.”59 
While material, “the underlying tasks which the governmental entity 
allegedly performed in a negligent manner” are not dispositive of 
liability.60 Therefore, “where a plaintiff is injured as a result of his or 
her involvement with a governmental function . . . the relevant 
governmental entity is immune from suit. . . . [But] if a plaintiff is 
injured as a result of his or her involvement with a proprietary 
 
 53. Order at 496, Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., No. 08 CVS 2443, 2012 WL 11818632, at *1 
(N.C. Super. Ct. 2012).  
 54. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 357, 758 S.E.2d at 644–45. 
 55. Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 746 S.E.2d 296, 307 (2013), rev’d 
in part, 367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014). 
 56. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring) (“[W]e 
have performed case-by-case inquiries in our previous governmental immunity cases.”). 
 57. Bynum, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 746 S.E.2d at 302 (quoting Estate of Williams ex rel. 
Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 203, 732 S.E.2d 
137, 143 (2012)). 
 58. Id. at ___, 746 S.E.2d at 303. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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function . . . then governmental immunity is not available.”61 
Accordingly, the court ruled that since North Carolina has “long held 
that a municipal corporation selling water for private consumption is 
acting in a proprietary capacity and can be held liable for negligence 
just like a privately owned water company,”62 the trial court did not 
err in denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 
governmental immunity grounds.63 
C. The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion 
Following the court of appeals’ rejection of its appeal, Wilson 
County requested further review from the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina. In language that now reads more like a roadmap to the 
court’s eventual conclusion than a synopsis of the hurdle that laid 
before the county, the plaintiff identified Wilson County’s burden on 
appeal: 
The case here passes every test argued by Wilson County 
and the various amici except one—that if any part of a building 
is used for a governmental purpose then the entire building, 
steps, parking lot and land are immunized from suit despite the 
fact proprietary functions are also taking place on site. This 
Court has never gone there.64 
In taking up Wilson County’s appeal from the lower court, the 
majority of the supreme court not only jumped at the above 
“invitation” from the plaintiff-appellee’s brief, but also apparently 
extended governmental immunity to include any building that is 
owned, used, constructed, or maintained by a county—whether or not 
that building is used (in whole or in part) for a governmental 
purpose.65 In short, the majority of the court not only went where it 
has never gone before but, apparently, beyond. 
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority—in a statement that 
both the court of appeals and the concurring justices would likely 
agree with—begins her analysis with the observation that the 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. (quoting Fussell v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 364 N.C. 222, 225, 695 
S.E.2d 437, 440 (2010)). 
 63. Bynum, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 746 S.E.2d at 307. 
 64. Plaintiffs-Appellees’ New Brief at 25, Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 758 
S.E.2d 643 (2014) (No. 380PA13), 2013 WL 6901617, at *26. 
 65. See Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 361, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) (Martin, 
J., concurring) (“This reasoning would seem to create a categorical rule barring any 
premises liability claims against counties or municipalities for harms that occur on 
government property.”). 
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availability of governmental immunity “turns on whether the alleged 
tortious conduct of the county or municipality arose from an activity 
that was governmental or proprietary in nature.”66 This threshold 
statement of law is consistent with the long-standing jurisprudence on 
governmental immunity detailed in cases like Williams, Aaser, and 
Sandy Creek. However, in applying the test established by cases like 
Williams67 to determine if a specific activity is governmental or 
proprietary, the majority opinion broke sharply from precedent in a 
shift made clear and denounced by the concurrence. 
The focal point of the majority’s concern with the lower court’s 
decision, and its basis for departing from precedent, was that the 
court’s reasoning would “subject[] different plaintiffs injured by the 
same act or omission to different immunity analyses on the basis of 
their reasons for visiting the same county property.”68 The supreme 
court, relying heavily on Williams, firmly stated that the rule set out 
by the court of appeals was inconsistent with established precedent.69 
Moreover, the majority found that the general assembly had 
statutorily assigned the “responsibilities of locating, supervising, and 
maintaining the county buildings that provide [discretionary, 
legislative, or public] functions.”70 Specifically, the majority focused 
on Chapter 153A of the North Carolina General Statutes, which 
requires all counties in North Carolina to “supervise the maintenance, 
repair, and use of all county property”71 and “to perform duties and 
responsibilities associated with enforcing State and local laws and 
ordinances relating to, inter alia, construction and maintenance of 
buildings.”72 Directly after citing these statutes, the majority found 
that the legislature had addressed this activity to a sufficient degree to 
rule it a governmental activity under Williams and summarily 
concluded that “the fact that the legislature has designated these 
responsibilities as governmental is dispositive.”73 Without so much as 
discussing the effect of this holding on rulings such as Aaser or Sandy 
 
 66. Id. at 358, 758 S.E.2d at 646 (majority opinion) (quoting Estate of Williams ex rel. 
Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 366 N.C. 195, 199, 732 S.E.2d 
137, 141 (2012)). 
 67. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text. 
 68. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647. 
 69. See id. (“The rule set out by the Court of Appeals . . . is inconsistent with our 
precedent on governmental immunity.”). 
 70. Id. 
 71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-169 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 72. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-351 to 
-352 (2013)). 
 73. Id. 
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Creek, the majority opinion reversed the lower courts’ decisions and 
remanded.74 
D. The Supreme Court’s Concurring Opinion 
The concurring opinion75 wastes little time in voicing the concern 
“that the reasoning employed in the majority opinion may 
categorically bar claims for harms occurring on county or municipal 
property.”76 While acknowledging the shortcomings of the “efforts 
over many years to bring clarity and predictability to the law of 
governmental immunity[,]”77 the concurring opinion correctly notes 
that Bynum upends existing precedent.78 Justice Martin notes that the 
majority would reject Aaser and instead find that “a municipality that 
owns and operates a sports arena to produce revenue would be 
immune from claims arising from its failure to properly maintain its 
facility.”79 Likewise, in Williams, the majority’s reasoning would have 
rendered moot the fact “that the County charged rental fees for use 
of the ‘Swimming Hole’ in which the decedent drowned—because the 
property was owned by the County.”80 
In contrast to the majority, the concurring justices’ analysis 
turned on the question of whether the building itself served a 
governmental—rather than proprietary—function. The concurring 
opinion notes that the Miller Road Building, “which is open to the 
public, houses the county commissioner’s meeting room, the county 
manager’s office, and several county departments, including water, 
finance, planning, inspections, human resources, and geographic 
information systems.”81 Additionally, the Miller Road Building 
provides the citizens of Wilson County a “convenient location . . . to 
access numerous government offices and services” and, as the 
majority pointed out, “serves the County’s discretionary, legislative, 
and public functions, several of which only may be performed by the 
Wilson County government.”82 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. The concurring opinion was written by Justice Martin and was joined by Justices 
Edmunds and Beasley. Id. at 360–362 (Martin, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 361, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (“This result is inconsistent with our long-standing 
precedent.”). 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 361, 758 S.E.2d at 648.  
 81. Id. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648.  
 82. Id. 
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Using this line of reasoning, the concurring opinion arrives at the 
same result as the majority while addressing the majority’s legitimate 
concern of “subjecting different plaintiffs injured by the same act or 
omission to different immunity analyses on the basis of their reasons 
for visiting the same county property.”83 While that concern may in 
fact be legitimate, the concurrence makes clear that the majority 
opinion was not a necessary outcome in this case. Indeed, under the 
concurring opinion’s holding, Mr. Bynum—visiting the Miller Road 
Building for a proprietary reason—would be treated no differently 
than someone visiting the building to attend a meeting of the county 
commissioners, to register a deed, or to take advantage of any 
number of the other governmental services offered at the building. As 
instructed by precedent, the three concurring justices focus on the 
“character of the municipality’s acts, rather than the nature of the 
plaintiff’s involvement”84 and hold in no uncertain terms that “this 
multi-use governmental office building undoubtedly serves a 
governmental function . . . [and a]ccordingly, plaintiffs’ claims are 
barred by governmental immunity.”85 Thus the concurrence both 
respected precedent and avoided the unfortunate circumstance of 
treating similarly situated plaintiffs disparately based on the reason 
for their involvement with the county. By disposing of the issue 
without so much as mentioning the reason for Mr. Bynum’s presence 
at the Miller Road Building, the concurrence implies that the majority 
need not have upended governmental immunity precedent in 
contravention of its own edict that “any modification or the repeal of 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General 
Assembly, not th[e] Court.”86 
III.  THE CONCURRING OPINION WAS THE CORRECT—AND 
PREFERABLE—INTERPRETATION 
This Part argues that the concurring opinion was both the correct 
result in terms of respecting precedent on the issue and also the better 
result in terms of limiting the corrosive effect of the doctrine of 
governmental immunity in North Carolina. As the concurrence points 
out, the majority opinion in Bynum expands the doctrine of 
governmental immunity to cover injuries occurring on any 
governmental property. This result is not in keeping with the court’s 
previous jurisprudence and eschews the precedent established by 
 
 83. Id. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647 (majority opinion). 
 84. Id. at 359, 758 S.E.2d at 646. 
 85. Id. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring). 
 86. Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971). 
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cases like Williams. The concurring opinion deftly sidesteps the 
majority’s professed need to expand the coverage of the doctrine and, 
in so doing, correctly constrains governmental immunity to its 
precedential moors. Instead, the Bynum majority has enacted a much 
broader categorical bar than any previous precedent—one that 
precludes premises liability for any property owned or leased by a 
county. 
In fairness to the majority, the plaintiff’s assertion that the “case 
here passes every test argued by Wilson County and the various amici 
except one”87 is not an accurate representation. Indeed, two separate 
briefs argued that the court of appeals’ failure to consider the 
statutory authority for counties to acquire property (including by 
lease)88 and to supervise the maintenance, repair, and use of all 
county property89 is grounds for reversal under the Williams test as 
required by statute.90 In its brief on appeal to the supreme court, 
Wilson County argued that its “statutory obligations to engage in 
inspection and maintenance of governmental property demonstrate 
that these acts are performed for the public good and are 
governmental in nature.”91 Likewise, the amicus curiae brief from the 
North Carolina League of Municipalities clearly notes that the 
opinion of the court of appeals “contains no references to Chapter 
153A of the North Carolina General Statutes” and suggests that, if it 
had, the lower court would have found that the “[r]esponsibility to 
supervise maintenance, repair, and use of county property is 
delegated, again by statute, to boards of county commissioners.”92 
These briefs argue that if the court of appeals had taken Chapter 
153A into account, it would have found the activity in question to be 
governmental in nature and therefore immunized from suit by 
governmental immunity. 
What these briefs fail to identify, and why the concurring opinion 
was correct in sidestepping the argument, is how a finding that 
Chapter 153A of the General Statutes immunizes municipal 
governments from premises liability would square with the North 
Carolina courts’ historical treatment of these types of actions. Indeed, 
while both of these briefs make extended use of Williams as the 
 
 87. Plaintiff-Appellees’ New Brief, supra note 64, at 25. 
 88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-158 (2013). 
 89. Id. § 153A-169. 
 90. See infra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 91. Defendant-Appellant Wilson County’s New Brief at 21, Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 
367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014) (No. 380PA13), 2013 WL 6143823, at *21. 
 92. North Carolina League of Municipalities’ Amicus Curiae Brief at 18, Bynum, 367 
N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (No. 380PA13), 2013 WL 6143826, at *18. 
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leading case on governmental immunity, neither argues that the 
Williams court’s failure to mention Chapter 153A was an omission 
worthy of revisiting. Remarkably, the court’s extended discussion of 
governmental immunity in Williams seems all but wasted considering 
that the second paragraph of that opinion states that the alleged 
negligence occurred at a public park that was “owned by defendant 
Pasquotank County and maintained and operated by defendant 
Pasquotank County Parks & Recreation Department.”93 If Chapter 
153A immunizes counties from premises liability, as the majority 
concludes, then the fact that the park was owned by Pasquotank 
County should have been the end of any discussion regarding their 
liability. Indeed, the court’s ruling in Williams would seem to suggest 
that if Mr. Bynum had been injured while inside the water 
department’s offices, a proper inquiry would be whether the provision 
of water service was a governmental or proprietary function.94 But 
post-Bynum, as the concurrence points out, that distinction, along 
with Sandy Creek’s demarcation between the governmental act of 
providing sewer service and the proprietary act of contracting for the 
construction of a sewer95—to make no mention of the entirely 
proprietary act in Aaser—no longer appears to merit consideration.96 
Moreover, neither the briefs for Wilson County and the North 
Carolina League of Municipalities nor the majority opinion in Bynum 
acknowledge the gallons of ink expended in the fact-specific 
inquiries97 of previous governmental immunity claims. Under the 
 
 93. Estate of Williams ex rel. Overton v. Pasquotank Cnty. Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 
366 N.C. 195, 196, 732 S.E.2d 137, 139 (2012). 
 94. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 361–62, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring) 
(“[U]nder the majority’s reasoning, it would have been irrelevant in Estate of Williams 
that the County charged rental fees for use of the ‘Swimming Hole’ in which the decedent 
drowned—because the property was owned by the County . . . and therefore the County 
had the statutory responsibility to maintain and repair the property, making the County 
immune to the tort claim. Rather than issuing such a holding in Estate of Williams, we 
remanded to the Court of Appeals, explaining, ‘[E]ven if the operation of a parks and 
recreation program is a governmental function by statute, the question remains whether 
the specific operation of the Swimming Hole component of [the county-owned public 
park], in this case and under these circumstances, is a governmental function.’ ” (citations 
omitted)). 
 95. Town of Sandy Creek v. E. Coast Contracting, Inc., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 741 
S.E.2d 673, 677 (2013). 
 96. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (2014) (Martin, J., concurring) (“By 
adopting what seems to be a categorical rule, the majority opinion may inadvertently 
broaden the scope of governmental immunity.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 746 S.E.2d 296, 302 
(2013), rev’d in part, 367 N.C. 355, 758 S.E.2d 643 (2014) (“[T]he proper designation of a 
particular action of a county or municipality is a fact intensive inquiry . . . .”); Williams, 366 
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Bynum court’s new conception of governmental immunity, the 
discussion of premises liability should have begun and ended where 
the property in question was a public library,98 the register of deeds 
office at the county courthouse,99 a series of public parks,100 or other 
premises associated with the government.101 Yet, in each of these 
prior cases, the result turned on the question of whether the property 
supported activities that were governmental or proprietary in 
nature.102 Despite maintaining that precedent supports the holding in 
Bynum, neither the briefs in support of the appellee’s position nor the 
majority opinion explain why these previous discussions were 
necessary—or even relevant—in light of the interpretation of Chapter 
153A that each urges. 
To be certain, the position advocated by the plaintiff and 
ultimately adopted by the court of appeals would have equally 
upended governmental immunity jurisprudence in the state of North 
Carolina had the supreme court affirmed it. When confronted with 
the court of appeals’ holding, the majority opinion was right to be 
concerned that the existing quagmire of governmental immunity 
jurisprudence would be exacerbated by a rule that subjects “different 
plaintiffs injured by the same act or omission to different immunity 
analyses on the basis of their reasons for visiting the same county 
property.”103 Indeed, the inconsistent outcomes that would inevitably 
result from such a test are perhaps the best argument in favor of 
respecting the precedential cases that ignored the plaintiffs’ actions 
and focused exclusively on the acts of the municipality.104 As the 
 
N.C. at 201, 732 S.E.2d at 142 (“Whether defendants are entitled to governmental 
immunity in this case turns on the facts alleged in the complaint.”). 
 98. Seibold v. Kinston-Lenoir Cnty. Pub. Library, 264 N.C. 360, 360, 141 S.E.2d 519, 
519 (1965) (per curiam). 
 99. Robinson v. Nash Cnty., 43 N.C. App. 33, 33–34, 257 S.E.2d 679, 679 (1979). 
 100. E.g., Williams, 366 N.C. at 196, 732 S.E.2d at 139 (publicly owned park, “Fun 
Junktion,” with a “Swimming Hole” rented out to private parties); Glenn v. City of 
Raleigh, 246 N.C. 469, 470, 98 S.E.2d 913, 914 (1957) (publicly owned, for-profit recreation 
ground). 
 101. See, e.g., Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 265 N.C. 494, 497, 144 S.E.2d 610, 613 (1965) 
(city-owned sports coliseum). 
 102. See, e.g., Williams, 366 N.C. at 201, 732 S.E.2d at 142 (“[T]he question remains 
whether the specific operation of the Swimming Hole component of Fun Junktion, in this 
case and under these circumstances, is a governmental function.”). 
 103. Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 360, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) (Martin, J., 
concurring). 
 104. See, e.g., Williams, 366 N.C. at 199, 732 S.E.2d at 141 (“In determining whether an 
entity is entitled to governmental immunity, the result therefore turns on whether the 
alleged tortious conduct of the county or municipality arose from an activity that was 
governmental or proprietary in nature.”). 
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concurring opinion deftly illustrates, however, this concern did not 
necessitate the adoption of a novel interpretation of governmental 
immunity to avoid treating similarly situated plaintiffs differently. By 
maintaining focus on the character of Wilson County’s actions—and 
not on those of the plaintiff—the concurrence avoids this inherently 
unfair result and exposes the flaw in the majority’s concern with the 
opinion from the court of appeals. 
The ease with which the three concurring justices arrive at the 
conclusion that “this multi-use governmental office building 
undoubtedly serves a governmental function”105 is eclipsed only by 
the fact that they would have granted governmental immunity to 
Wilson County without mentioning the reason for Mr. Bynum’s 
presence at the building. In fact, nowhere in their opinion do the three 
concurring justices find it relevant to mention that Mr. Bynum was 
there to pay a water bill or that the provision of water service is an 
inherently proprietary function of government. Not only is this 
approach in line with the courts’ precedent that it is the acts of the 
municipality, and not those of the plaintiff, that are relevant to 
governmental immunity,106 but it also limits the scope of the fact-
specific inquiry to be undertaken. Moreover, the concurrence avoids 
the expansive reading of Chapter 153A adopted by the majority to 
protect the defendant county. Perhaps more than any other aspect of 
the opinions, the concurring justices’ handling of the concerns raised 
by the court of appeals’ opinion suggests that the majority opinion is a 
solution in search of a problem. 
From Bynum emerges a categorical rule that bars premises 
liability for any property owned or leased by a county based on the 
majority’s broad—and unnecessary—reading of Chapter 153A’s 
delegation of the responsibility to supervise the maintenance and 
repair of all county property. If the majority’s concern regarding 
disparate treatment for similarly situated individuals were well 
founded, the result in Bynum could perhaps be understood as 
necessary despite its precedential inappropriateness. However, the 
ease with which the three concurring justices dispatched that concern 
demonstrates that this result was not required. Instead, the majority 
holding in this case uses Chapter 153A to unnecessarily broaden the 
scope of governmental immunity beyond its already unsound 
 
 105. Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring). 
 106. See, e.g., Williams, 366 N.C. at 199, 732 S.E.2d at 141 (“In determining whether an 
entity is entitled to governmental immunity, the result therefore turns on whether the 
alleged tortious conduct of the county or municipality arose from an activity that was 
governmental or proprietary in nature.”). 
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moorings.107 However, as the next Part argues, the general assembly 
can and should return a semblance of accountability to the doctrine. 
IV.  A CALL TO ACTION FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Although the decision significantly muddied the waters of 
governmental immunity, what remains clear after Bynum is that 
North Carolinians continue to confront a problem in desperate need 
of a solution. Fortunately, the courts have consistently recognized the 
general assembly’s authority to modify or abrogate the doctrine of 
governmental immunity in the state. This Part argues that, in light of 
the court’s expansion of governmental immunity in Bynum, it is now 
incumbent on the general assembly to clarify and limit the doctrine. 
To that end, this Part briefly overviews the actions taken by other 
state legislatures before turning to the argument, advanced by a 
number of contemporary scholars, that governmental immunity can 
no longer be normatively justified as sound public policy. 
Although the rule that emerges from Bynum may prove less 
unwieldy than its predecessors due to its threshold reliance on 
Chapter 153A,108 it exacerbates the disconnect between the current 
state of governmental immunity and the underlying policy that 
originally gave rise to the doctrine. The doctrine of governmental 
immunity has long been fraught with inconsistencies and worrisome 
consequences that the legislature would have been wise to address. 
Yet after Bynum, the need for action is even more pressing. On the 
one hand, the long-held conception that governmental immunity rests 
exclusively on public policy grounds109 is difficult to square with the 
general assembly’s nearly complete abdication of its responsibility to 
define the scope of that policy interest.110 On the other hand, it is 
 
 107. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring). To be 
certain, the doctrine of governmental immunity was well-entrenched prior to the Bynum 
ruling. See Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 519, 186 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1972) 
(“This Court has not departed from the rule of governmental immunity adopted in the 
year 1889.”). However, as the court has previously noted and as Part IV of this Recent 
Development argues, even the historical conception of the doctrine was unsound and in 
desperate need of review from the legislature. See Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 
589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971) (“It may well be that the logic of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity is unsound and that the reasons which led to its adoption are not as 
forceful today as they were when it was adopted.”). 
 108. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 647. 
 109. See N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Guilford Technical Cmty. Coll., 364 
N.C. 102, 107, 691 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2010) (finding that governmental immunity is “an 
established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound public policy”). 
 110. As recently as 1995, the general assembly attempted to reform municipal 
governmental immunity but was unable to pass any meaningful legislation. See Jeremy D. 
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difficult to interpret the judiciary’s professed lack of a cohesive 
standard111 and repeated acknowledgement that changes to the 
doctrine should come from the legislative branch112 as anything less 
than a repeated request to take up an issue that increasingly belongs 
less to the common law and more to its statutory counterpart.113 
Although the ruling in Bynum suggests that courts may be willing, 
albeit inadvertently, to modify governmental immunity,114 their 
continued reluctance to explicitly do so requires that the general 
assembly address this issue. 
A. National Legislative and Judicial Reception to the Doctrine 
In fairness to the general assembly, only three states expressly 
recognize absolute immunity in their constitutions115 while only one 
state allows government tortfeasors to be sued to the same extent as 
their private counterparts.116 But despite a growing number of states 
that have transitioned from defining governmental immunity through 
common law to setting its boundaries by statute, North Carolina has 
proven remarkably content to allow the judiciary to continue to 
 
Arkin, Recent Development, Police Chase the Bad Guys, and Plaintiffs Chase the Police: 
Young v. Woodall and the Standard of Care for Officers in Pursuit, 75 N.C. L. REV. 2468, 
2493 (1997). However, the general assembly has passed legislation permitting a 
municipality to waive immunity through the purchase of insurance or risk-sharing pools. 
See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 111. See Bynum, 367 N.C. at 360, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., concurring) (“Despite 
efforts over many years to bring clarity and predictability to the law of governmental 
immunity, this goal has remained somewhat elusive.”); see also Evans ex rel. Horton v. 
Hous. Auth. of Raleigh, 359 N.C. 50, 54, 602 S.E.2d 668, 671 (2004) (“We have provided 
various tests for determining into which category [(governmental or proprietary)] a 
particular activity falls . . . .”). 
 112. E.g., Steelman, 279 N.C. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243 (“[A]ny modification or the 
repeal of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General Assembly, 
not this Court.”). 
 113. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 114. The courts have not explicitly abandoned the stance that “the repeal of the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General Assembly.” Steelman, 279 
N.C. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243. However, as Justice Martin points out, the holding in 
Bynum does modify the doctrine and “may inadvertently broaden the scope of 
governmental immunity.” Bynum, 367 N.C. at 362, 758 S.E.2d at 648 (Martin, J., 
concurring). 
 115. ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 14 (“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a 
defendant in any court of law or equity.”); ARK. CONST. art. 5, § 20 (“The State of 
Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.”); W. VA. CONST. art. 6, 
§ 35 (“The state of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in any court of law or 
equity . . . .”). 
 116. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.090, 4.96.010 (West 2006) (“The state of 
Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for 
damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person 
or corporation.”). 
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define the doctrine.117 Considering only legislation that would have 
affected the Bynum decision, at least thirteen states have abolished 
the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions118 
that has caused so much consternation in North Carolina courts119 and 
that serves no purpose within the broader framework of public 
policy.120 Additionally, a growing number of states have chosen to 
statutorily identify the instances in which a government entity has 
 
 117. North Carolina is nowhere to be found among either the thirty-three states that 
have statutory immunity for discretionary government functions; the twenty-four states 
that recognize immunity for issuance, denial, or revocation of a license; or the twenty-four 
states that recognize immunity for failure to inspect or make adequate inspection of 
property. Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, 
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 805 & n.28, 807 & nn.33–34 
(2007). 
 118. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-903 (2012) (“[E]very governmental entity is subject to 
liability . . . whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function.”); IOWA CODE 
§ 670.2 (2015) (“[E]very municipality is subject to liability . . . whether arising out of a 
governmental or proprietary function . . . .”); MINN. STAT. § 466.02 (2014) (“[E]very 
municipality is subject to liability . . . whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary 
function.”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-3 (West 1999) (“[T]he ‘state’ and its ‘political 
subdivisions,’ . . . are not now, have never been and shall not be liable, and are, always 
have been and shall continue to be immune from suit at law or in 
equity . . . notwithstanding that any such act, omission or breach constitutes or may be 
considered as the exercise or failure to exercise any duty, obligation or function of a 
governmental, proprietary, discretionary or ministerial nature and notwithstanding that 
such act, omission or breach may or may not arise out of any activity, transaction or 
service for which any fee, charge, cost or other consideration was received or expected to 
be received in exchange therefor.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(A)(1) (LexisNexis 
2008) (“[A] political subdivision is not liable . . . in connection with a governmental or 
proprietary function.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 152.1 (West 2008) (“The state [and] 
its political subdivisions, . . . whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, 
shall be immune from liability for torts.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.265 (2007) (“[E]very 
public body is subject to civil action for its torts . . . whether arising out of a governmental 
or proprietary function . . . .”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-32A-3 (2004) (“[A]ny public 
entity is immune from liability for damages whether the function in which it is involved is 
governmental or proprietary.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-20-201 (2012) (“[A]ll 
governmental entities shall be immune from suit . . . from the activities of such 
governmental entities wherein such governmental entities are engaged in the exercise and 
discharge of any of their functions, governmental or proprietary.”); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4.92.090 (West 2006) (“The state of Washington, whether acting in its 
governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages . . . .”); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 29-12A-4 (LexisNexis 2008) (“[T]he provisions of this article shall apply to both 
governmental and proprietary functions.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-102 (1996) (“[T]his 
act abolishes all judicially created categories such as ‘governmental’ or ‘proprietary’ 
functions and ‘discretionary’ or ‘ministerial’ acts previously used by the courts to 
determine immunity or liability.”); Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d 421, 
424 (Me. 1987) (“Since the ‘proprietary activity’ exception to sovereign immunity has its 
source solely in the common law, . . . that exception has been abrogated by the Tort 
Claims Act.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 119. See supra note 4. 
 120. See infra Section IV.C. 
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immunity, rather than defaulting to immunity in the absence of a 
statutory waiver.121 Some states specifically permit a government 
entity to be sued only in instances of injuries caused by the condition 
or use of public property.122 
However, despite frequently expressing skepticism about both its 
merits123 and the consistency of its application124 and acknowledging 
the changing judicial reception to it in other jurisdictions,125 North 
Carolina courts have maintained that “the repeal of the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity should come from the General Assembly.”126 In 
light of the courts’ steadfast refusal to revisit the issue, it is critical 
that the general assembly move to limit the doctrine. In doing so, the 
general assembly should note—and this Part argues—that the 
doctrine should be significantly curtailed as both repugnant to the 
notion of government accountability contained in the state’s 
constitution and subversive to the compensation and deterrence 
policy rationales that underlie tort law. 
 
 121. Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 805–09 (“For example, thirty-three states recognize 
discretionary-function immunity, twenty-three recognize immunity for injuries caused by 
reliance on statutes or other enactments, twenty-three immunize the collection of a tax, 
seventeen immunize specified intentional torts of public employees, and forty states confer 
immunity from punitive damages. Other common immunities conferred on state and local 
governments or their employees include immunity for issuance, denial, or revocation of a 
license; a failure to inspect or to make an adequate inspection of property; the adoption or 
failure to adopt legislation or other legislative functions; acts or omissions in the execution 
or enforcement of the law; the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings; the 
plan or design for public improvements; the condition of property or facilities used for 
recreational purposes or of unimproved public property; a failure to provide adequate 
police service or protection or to provide adequate jails or other corrections or penal 
facilities; the probation, parole, release, or escape of arrestees, convicts, or prisoners; a 
failure to provide adequate firefighting or other emergency service; a failure to provide 
adequate medical care or to prevent disease or impose a quarantine; and specified 
unintentional torts.”). 
 122. See id. at 809–10 & n.48. 
 123. See Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 595, 184 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1971) 
(“It may well be that the logic of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is unsound and that 
the reasons which led to its adoption are not as forceful today as they were when it was 
adopted.”). 
 124. See Bynum v. Wilson Cnty., 367 N.C. 355, 360, 758 S.E.2d 643, 647 (2014) (Martin, 
J., concurring) (“Despite efforts over many years to bring clarity and predictability to the 
law of governmental immunity, this goal has remained somewhat elusive.”). 
 125. See Steelman, 279 N.C. at 593, 184 S.E.2d at 242 (“Since 1957 fifteen jurisdictions, 
in addition to Florida, have overruled or greatly modified the immunization of 
municipalities from tort liability.”). 
 126. Id. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at 243. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1972 (2015) 
1994 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
B. Governmental Immunity Undermines Accountability To the 
People 
In a case that has been quite fairly termed the “fountainhead of 
all of our constitutional law,”127 Chief Justice John Marshall succinctly 
stated that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever 
he receives an injury.”128 If this statement remains true today—and 
there is no reason to suspect it does not—it presents serious questions 
about the constitutionality of a doctrine that creates an impenetrable 
barrier to those who would claim the protection of the laws. The 
foundation for the doctrine itself can be found nowhere in the 
Constitution.129 Beyond being unable to locate the constitutional 
underpinnings of the doctrine, at least two noted constitutional 
scholars, Erwin Chemerinsky and Akhil Reed Amar, have concluded 
that the immunity “doctrine conflicts with too many basic 
constitutional principles to survive.”130 While these arguments may 
someday prove compelling to the United States Supreme Court, it is 
the North Carolina Constitution to which our state courts and the 
general assembly should turn for guidance on this issue. 
The principle that the government of this state must be 
accountable to her people is firmly embedded in the North Carolina 
Constitution,131 and the doctrine of governmental immunity runs so 
contrary to that notion as to be unsupportable. If, as Professor Amar 
has suggested, the opening phrase of the U.S. Constitution, “We the 
people,”132 makes the citizens sovereign and embodies the principle of 
 
 127. James Rosen, Video and Transcript: 2011 FOX Interview with Rehnquist, FOX 
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/09/04/video-and-transcript-
2001-fox-interview-with-rehnquist/ (interview taken May 21, 2001).  
 128. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 129. To refute originalist supporters of sovereign immunity, Professor Chemerinsky 
argues that “[t]he text of the Constitution is silent about sovereign immunity. Not one 
clause of the first seven articles even remotely hints at the idea of governmental immunity 
from suits. No constitutional amendment has bestowed sovereign immunity on the federal 
government.” Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1205. For the nonoriginalists, he offers a 
lengthy rebuke of the notion that “sovereign immunity is a value that should be seen as 
embodied in the Constitution.” Id. at 1210–16. 
 130. Id. at 1203; see also Amar, supra note 5, at 1426 (“A state government that orders 
or allows its officials to violate citizens’ federal constitutional rights can invoke ‘sovereign’ 
immunity from all liability—even if such immunity means that the state’s wrongdoing will 
go partially or wholly unremedied.”). Although both authors center their respective 
critiques of state sovereign immunity against allegations of a citizen’s federal 
constitutional rights, there is no reason to believe that there should be less of a remedy 
when the violation is physical instead of constitutional. 
 131. See infra notes 134–41 and accompanying text. 
 132. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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government accountability to them,133 then surely the opening phrase 
of the state constitution, “We, the people of the State of North 
Carolina,”134 confers no less a responsibility on our state officials.135 
Moreover, the courts of North Carolina need not make Professor 
Amar’s logical leap from “We the people” to citizen sovereignty.136 
Indeed, the state constitution goes beyond its federal counterpart and 
expressly provides that “[a]ll political power is vested in and derived 
from the people; all government of right originates from the people, is 
founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of 
the whole.”137 
Furthermore, others have argued that the First Amendment’s 
right-to-petition clause, which guarantees the “right of the people . . . 
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,”138 clearly 
establishes “the right of the individual to seek redress from 
government wrongdoing in court, a right historically calculated to 
overcome any threshold government immunity from suit.”139 But the 
North Carolina Constitution affirms that right in even more specific 
language than its federal counterpart. Indeed, the North Carolina 
Constitution grants the people a right “to apply to the General 
Assembly for redress of grievances”140 while also quite separately 
granting them the right to “remedy by due course of law” for “an 
injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation” to “be 
administered without favor, denial, or delay.”141 Certainly, it is 
difficult to imagine how Bynum was “administered without favor” 
when the court granted immunity based solely on Wilson County’s 
standing as a government entity. 
While the United States and North Carolina implicitly and 
explicitly reject all manner of royal prerogatives, the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity undeniably descends from the English legal 
maxim that “the King can do no wrong.”142 As Professor Chemerinsky 
 
 133. See Amar, supra note 5, at 1449–50. 
 134. N.C. CONST. pmbl. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Amar, supra note 5, at 1449–50. 
 137. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 2. 
 138. U.S. CONST., amend. I. 
 139. James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First 
Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
899, 980 (1997). 
 140. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
 141. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18. 
 142. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1201; see also Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty 
and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 87 (1989) (explaining the 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1972 (2015) 
1996 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
has detailed at the federal level, “government accountability can be 
found in many parts of the Constitution” and “[s]overeign immunity 
is inconsistent with this basic precept.”143 This statement is no less 
true at the state level. In fact, it may be more true, given that the state 
constitution provides for additional protections and the connection 
between the sovereign and her citizens is, if anything, greater than at 
the federal level.144 
C. Governmental Immunity Is Not a Sound Public Policy 
Despite common misuse in contemporary American 
conversation, the phrase “begging the question”145 is rightly reserved 
for circular arguments like the cursory and oft-repeated axiom of 
North Carolina courts that governmental immunity “rest[s] on 
grounds of sound public policy.”146 In a manner that ill fits a doctrine 
enjoying such longevity, the truth of this proposition has long been 
assumed without the proof normally required of such an assertion. 
The court’s insistence on this well-established doctrine, which has 
significant and often harmful repercussions for individuals, suggests 
that it ought to be firmly based in a sound public policy rationale. Yet 
the case law’s silence on what exactly this policy rationale is suggests 
that it must be revisited and explored in greater depth. 
Cases like Bynum present a rare opportunity to revisit the 
justifications for the doctrine and reevaluate—rather than just 
accept—the proposition that governmental immunity is grounded in 
sound public policy reasoning.147 This Section does just that by 
evaluating the doctrine under the two most commonly accepted 
 
origins of sovereign immunity in English law); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY app. B at 1956 
(10th ed. 2014) (“Rex non potest peccare. The king can do no wrong.”). 
 143. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1214. 
 144. See, e.g., V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
835, 874 (2004) (“And, yet, there is a kernel of truth that remains to the proposition that 
the state governments are, at least relatively, closer to the people than is the federal 
government.”). 
 145. See, e.g., Philip B. Corbett, Begging the Question, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Sept, 25, 
2008), http://afterdeadline.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/begging-the-question-again/?_r=0 
(noting frequent misuse of “begging the question” in the New York Times and providing 
the correct definition as “refer[ring] to a circular argument . . . that assumes as proved the 
very thing one is trying to prove”). 
 146. N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Bd. of Trs. of Guilford Technical Cmty. Coll., 364 N.C. 
102, 107, 691 S.E.2d 694, 697 (2010). 
 147. While this section focuses exclusively on the public policy of immunizing localities 
from tort liability, other justifications for the doctrine could be offered. To the extent that 
such potential justifications merit consideration, they were not addressed by the Bynum 
court and are outside the scope of this Recent Development. 
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rationales for tort liability: the need to compensate injured individuals 
and the need to deter future tortious acts.148 
1.  Compensation 
While it appears that no body of scholarship has taken the 
position that injured individuals do not deserve to be compensated, 
many writers have taken issue with the equity of compensating 
injured individuals at the expense of fellow citizens who bear little or 
no responsibility for the injury.149 Arguments that taxpayers are the 
proper party to bear this economic cost, since they are, by and large, 
the voters responsible for electing the responsible government 
officials,150 have encountered marked hostility and have been 
unpersuasive to those jurisdictions that continue to immunize local 
governments against tort liability.151 Critics of allowing government 
liability based on the compensation rationale have concluded that 
“[a]t most, we are left with an argument for providing those injured 
by tortious government conduct with some form of publicly funded 
insurance—although . . . the justification for having taxpayers fund 
this obligation rather than leaving the insurance decision to each 
individual is entirely unclear.”152 
However, the general assembly’s grant of legislative authority 
permitting local governments to waive immunity through the 
purchase of liability insurance and participation in risk-sharing 
pools153 provides some insight into the true public policy of this state. 
North Carolina’s decision to grant authority to local governments to 
purchase insurance or participate in local government risk pools with 
a cost to be ultimately borne by the taxpayers seems difficult to 
 
 148. See Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 1216; see also Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 824 
(pointing out the Supreme Court’s “repeat[ed]” reasoning that constitutional torts both 
effectively compensate the injured and also provide adequate deterrence, before 
discussing the difficulties of this view). 
 149. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 827 (noting that the argument cannot apply 
to those who voted against current elected officials and that, whereas shareholders can 
always sell their shares and they do exercise effective control, taxpayers are limited by the 
cost of moving and the one-man-one-vote principle). 
 150. See Bernard P. Dauenhauer & Michael L. Wells, Corrective Justice and 
Constitutional Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 903, 923 (2001). 
 151. See Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 827 (“But this is hardly corrective justice from 
the standpoint of those voter-taxpayers who backed the losing candidate in the last 
election. Moreover, a shareholder who is dissatisfied with management policy may always 
sell, but a taxpayer can relocate to another jurisdiction only at considerable cost. And 
taxpayers do not have the kind of effective control over government policy vested in 
owner-shareholders.”). 
 152. Id. at 826. 
 153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485(a) (1999). 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1972 (2015) 
1998 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
square with the alleged public policy rationale behind sovereign 
immunity—that citizens have no economic obligation to indemnify 
the government for its own negligent actions. At the very least, this 
legislative enactment suggests that the state’s public policy is that 
local governments should pursue the most cost-effective means to 
ensure that a remedy exists for citizens injured by governmental 
malfeasance. But if we are to understand that the public policy of this 
state is that taxpayers should not be made to compensate individuals 
injured by government negligence, then the purchase of insurance 
surely runs counter to that proposition. Certainly the general 
assembly would not allow local governments to expend taxpayer 
funds on the purchase of insurance if it is an unnecessary expenditure, 
given that they will otherwise never be liable for their negligence.154 
In light of Bynum, there appears to be no reason for the general 
assembly to permit, or for local governments to undertake, the 
wasteful and unnecessary purchase of premises liability insurance 
given the court’s treatment of Chapter 153A and its unwillingness to 
subject them to the liability covered by such a policy. 
Moreover, it may be suggested that continuing to uphold the 
doctrine of governmental immunity represents a value judgment that 
protecting citizens from paying their marginal share of compensation 
is more important than guaranteeing the right of injured individuals 
to receive compensation.155 If this is truly the value judgment that has 
been made, it is not justified by any of the legislative enactments or 
judicial opinions on the topic. Further, this argument flies in the face 
of the United States Supreme Court’s statement that injuries caused 
by state actors should not be borne solely by the injured: 
[I]t is the public at large which enjoys the benefits of the 
government’s activities, and it is the public at large which is 
ultimately responsible for its administration. Thus . . . it is fairer 
to allocate any resulting financial loss [from tort liability] to the 
inevitable costs of government borne by all the taxpayers, than 
 
 154. See, e.g., Gerald R. Gibbons, Liability Insurance and the Tort Immunity of State 
and Local Government, 1959 DUKE L.J. 588, 594 (“[Although in] most states statutes now 
authorize the purchase of liability insurance covering specific immune governmental 
activities . . . absent such authorization, the courts have held the purchase to be ultra vires 
as well as a wasteful, unnecessary expenditure of public funds.” (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted)). 
 155. Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 826 (“[S]ince the economic cost of damages awards 
falls on taxpayers not responsible in any direct fashion for tortious conduct, the corrective-
justice rationale for governmental damages liability for common-law torts is also 
wanting.”). 
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to allow its impact to be felt solely by those whose 
rights . . . have been violated.156 
Where the general assembly has indicated through its 
authorization of local governments to purchase liability insurance that 
it is not opposed to taxpayers bearing a marginal cost for the 
protection of those injured by government malfeasance, the argument 
that it is the public policy of this state not to place the burden of tort 
liability on citizens largely breaks down. Moreover, if the general 
assembly is prepared to sanction the supreme court’s approach in 
Bynum through continued silence on the topic, it should also be 
prepared to defend the implicit normative judgment that a citizenry 
that reaps the benefits of governmental activity need not bear the 
burdens of governmental failures. 
2.  Deterrence 
Using tort liability to deter a government actor—who ultimately 
transfers the cost of damages to the citizenry—clearly differs from 
using tort liability to deter an individual actor who must bear his own 
costs. Despite the difficulties inherent in deterring government actors 
through tort liability, achieving the desired deterrent effect is not 
impossible. Yet the Bynum decision has little to no deterrent effect, 
instead allowing a county to ignore its lawful duty to maintain 
government buildings with complete impunity. This result fails to 
further tort liability’s goal of deterrence in any way. Deterrence of 
government actors takes one of two forms, each of which is discussed 
in turn: voters leaving the tax base, or “foot voting”—similar to 
shareholders selling their stock—and voters holding public officials 
accountable at the ballot box. 
Despite recent critiques of foot voting in protest of substantial 
tort liability, the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as the 
scholars reacting to its decisions, have long accepted the idea that tort 
liability can be counted upon to deter officials from engaging in 
governmental misconduct in the same manner as private tort law.157 
Critics of this theory correctly note that “shareholders of private 
corporations . . . can readily sell their stock at any time, yet taxpayers 
 
 156. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 655 (1980). Although this part of 
Owen dealt more narrowly with the question of whether a city could claim a good-faith 
defense for violation of a newly recognized constitutional right, id., the reasoning is 
nonetheless more generally applicable—a fortiori the burden of damages that result from 
government tortious conduct ought to be spread among all taxpayers rather than being 
borne by the injured individual. 
 157. See Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 824 & nn.110–11. 
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must fund essentially unlimited liability and face substantial costs if 
they wish to ‘exit’ the jurisdictions that tax them to fund 
governmental liabilities.”158 But nowhere in the various critiques of 
this theory is it suggested that government liability has no effect on 
the choices made by citizens to move in to or out of a particular 
jurisdiction. It is not difficult to imagine the quality of public 
buildings, roads, schools, and emergency services playing a factor in a 
decision of whether and where to relocate—and each of these services 
is a factor of the funds available after any hypothetical tort liability.159 
A government that exposes itself to substantial tort liability will 
inevitably experience a decline in its ability to provide other 
government services160 that could spur “foot voting” among citizens 
with certain minimum expectations regarding the provision of 
services from their municipality. Thus, the admittedly limited ability 
(at least compared to shareholders of publicly traded companies) of 
citizens to “vote with their feet” still provides more of a deterrent 
than the post-Bynum system’s complete absence of any deterrent 
effect. 
In addition to relocating, voters can also deter tortious 
government conduct via the ballot box. Critics of this approach to 
justifying governmental tort liability suggest that government officials 
already have an incentive to keep the public safe since, even in the 
absence of tort liability, government officials will presumably be 
voted out of office if they fail to protect their citizens.161 This 
 
 158. Id. at 825–26. 
 159. Even those who suggest that the limited ability of individuals to relocate reduces 
the deterrent effect on local governments to avoid tort liability admit that “at least some 
businesses and individuals are able to opt out of the local political process by moving to a 
different location, and . . . new businesses and residents are always free to select their 
desired location.” Id. at 847; see also WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 155 (2007) (theorizing that so long as moving costs are 
low, local governments and their monopoly service-providing bureaus will be subject to 
adequate competitive pressure to ensure responsiveness and the lowest-cost provision of 
services); PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 22–38, 71 (1981) (identifying the primary 
interest of a city as its overall economic productivity, which in turn depends on 
maintaining a favorable average ratio of benefits received to taxes paid—particularly for 
those who pay a disproportionate share of taxes and are therefore the most mobile); 
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 
(1956) (positing that the mobile consumer-voter chooses from among local governments 
the one that best provides the public goods on which he places the greatest premium, such 
as schools, “beaches, parks, police protection, roads, and parking facilities”). 
 160. Alternatively, the locality could alleviate any shortfall through increased taxes, 
although that move is arguably more likely to be noticed and poorly received by the 
citizenry than a marginal decline in the provision of government services. 
 161. Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 848 (“[P]olitical vulnerability . . . can be at least as 
important as the threat of damages liability.”). 
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argument presumes that the imposition of tort liability does little to 
change or enhance the deterrent effect government officials already 
experience through voter accountability. To support this conclusion, 
these critics point to major catastrophes like the 1947 Port of Texas 
City disaster that killed 560 people, wounded 3000, and caused 
damages of over $300 million,162 or the government’s failure to 
foresee and repair the problems that inevitably led to the collapse of 
the levees protecting New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina.163 Noting that “political forces come powerfully into play 
when the government endangers the public’s safety,” scholars are 
quick to point out that “[a]ny instance of government bungling that 
compromises the public’s safety is likely to have potent political 
consequences.”164 
There is certainly little doubt that voters did not need the added 
incentive of tort damages in order to hold government officials 
responsible for their failure to keep the public safe in either event. 
However, the aforementioned examples are highly visible, 
catastrophic, and large-scale events, whereas the events that tort 
liability has the tendency to deter occur on a smaller stage and with 
less public scrutiny. Therefore, it is essential that tort liability spark 
the deterrent effect where voter accountability is not likely to do so. 
As noted by one scholar, when citizens pursue claims against the 
government “valuable information is unearthed and exposed” and, 
consequently, “[w]ith exposure comes publicity.”165 Indeed, the 
observations of these critics are perhaps the strongest evidence of the 
need for government liability in cases exactly like that of Mr. 
Bynum—where awareness, and corresponding outrage, are most 
likely to be lacking. 
 
 162. See generally BILL MINUTAGLIO, CITY OF FIRE: THE EXPLOSION THAT 
DEVASTATED A TEXAS TOWN AND IGNITED A HISTORIC LEGAL BATTLE (2004) (giving 
an account of the explosion and ensuing legal battles). 
 163. See Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 849; see also John Schwartz, Army Builders 
Accept Blame over Flooding, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/02/us/nationalspecial/02corps.html (describing the Army 
Corps of Engineers’ acceptance of responsibility for failing to adequately design and 
maintain New Orleans’ levee system before Hurricane Katrina); John Schwartz, New 
Study of Levees Faults Design and Construction, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/us/22corps.html (reporting on a study finding a 
“complex web of public and private organizations” responsible for the failure of the levee 
system). 
 164. Rosenthal, supra note 117, at 850. 
 165. Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of 
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 859–60 (2001). 
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Considered in this light, tort liability serves two critical purposes 
in allowing the public to deter governmental wrongdoing. First, by 
threatening to divert resources from other projects the public cares 
about, tort liability creates public awareness of the government’s 
failure that would otherwise be missing. The voting public is 
exceedingly more likely to care about—or even be aware of—Mr. 
Bynum’s plight when it threatens to impact the funding of a 
governmental program directly impacting the public. Second, a 
finding of liability gives judicial credence and authority to the notion 
that the government has failed in one of its basic obligations—
protecting the citizenry.166 Liability—and its corresponding award of 
damages—signals to the voting public that the government has failed 
to live up to its burden and that those responsible for that failure 
should be held accountable at the ballot box. It is not enough to say 
that these effects would be “indeterminate” or that they would be less 
effective than in the realm of private tort law. What matters is that 
they would provide some deterrence—something that is noticeably 
absent under the current system established by Bynum. 
The disconnect between the stated public policy rationales for 
governmental immunity and the actual effect of the legislation put 
forth by the general assembly and of the court’s decision in Bynum is 
clear. It can no longer be said that the public policy of the state is to 
protect citizen taxpayers from the nominal burden of compensating 
individuals injured through the negligence of a municipality.167 The 
general assembly has, for years, permitted counties to provide for the 
compensation of injured individuals through insurance and risk 
pooling agreements with a cost that is consistently borne by all 
citizens of a locality.168 Moreover, the suggestion that high-profile 
government misfeasance draws a fair comparison to less well-known 
cases like those of Mr. Bynum is prima facie absurd. The prophylactic 
exposure and publicity of a public suit and award of damages is a 
necessary component of the deterrence of governmental neglect. 
 
 166. See, e.g., Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317–18 (2d. Cir. 2000) 
(“A judgment against a municipality not only holds that entity responsible for its actions 
and inactions, but also can encourage the municipality to reform the patterns and practices 
that led to constitutional violations, as well as alert the municipality and its citizenry to the 
issue.”); Gilles, supra note 165, at 861 (“In addition to serving an informational function, 
municipal liability claims serve a ‘fault-fixing’ function, localizing culpability in the 
municipality itself, and forcing municipal policymakers to consider reformative 
measures.”). 
 167. See supra Section IV.B. 
 168. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, the continued efficacy of governmental immunity in this state is 
a barrier to both of the underlying goals of tort policy. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the Bynum majority’s professed belief that its decision 
rests squarely on the shoulders of a century’s worth of established 
governmental immunity jurisprudence, the practical implication of 
the holding is to render moot the very case law on which it claims to 
be built. No longer is the City of Charlotte liable for damages where 
the coliseum was clearly a proprietary activity.169 No longer does it 
matter where in Pasquotank County’s park a citizen was injured.170 
And no longer does it matter that, even though providing sewer 
service is a governmental function, the act of contracting for sewer 
construction is proprietary.171 Even more noteworthy than this 
marked departure from governmental-immunity precedent is the 
opinion’s modification of the doctrine despite the court’s long-held 
belief that any such modification should come via legislation. Further, 
the court fails to even acknowledge the sea of change that it has 
unleashed. 
Although the Bynum court departed significantly from precedent 
by extending and clarifying the common-law barriers that insulate 
government entities from accountability for their actions, the court 
created a unique opportunity for the general assembly to revisit the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity and definitively establish the public 
policy of this state. It is incumbent upon the general assembly to 
repeal this vestige of royal prerogative and restore the remedial rights 
of its citizens that are mandated by the goals of tort law and 
guaranteed by the state’s constitution. 
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